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AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS 
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION 
REMEDIES (TENTATIVE DRAFT). Recommended by the Advisory Com-
mittee on Sentencing and Review. Chicago: American Bar Associa-
tion. 1966. Pp. xii, 123. Paper, $2. 
If the American Bar Association (ABA) had undertaken to for-
mulate standards for criminal justice twenty or thirty years ago, post-
conviction remedies would hardly have been on the agenda. The 
very term would have been unfamiliar and largely meaningless. 
There was no conception of a general system of judicial review in 
criminal cases after a direct appeal had been taken or the time for 
appeal had expired. The accepted notion was that, apart from truly 
exceptional situations, a criminal proceeding was concluded-and 
due process satisfied-after a full hearing in the trial and appellate 
courts of proper jurisdiction. The exceptional situations were those 
in which the defendant was in effect not given a real hearing, as in 
a mob-dominated proceeding, or, under certain circumstances, those 
in which he was not provided with counsel. To meet the need for 
post-conviction review of the occasional cases which raised questions 
of this nature, the federal courts pressed into service the writ of 
habeas corpus, and the state courts made use of either habeas corpus 
or other venerable common-law ·writs. Given the rarity of the occa-
sion and the limited nature of the questions, these writs could, with 
some judicial manipulation, serve adequately as a remedy. 
·what has happened during the past two or three decades to 
change this situation is now ·well known, though not altogether un-
derstood. The exceptional situations, rather than remaining excep-
tional, have turned out to be only the forerunners of an elaborate 
complex of constitutional rights for defendants and, at least in the 
federal courts, of a vastly broadened system of collateral review by 
which these burgeoning rights can be vindicated outside the tradi-
tional channels of trial and appeal. The result, fully realized only 
within the last few years, has been to subject state convictions to the 
potential of an almost routine federal district court review. This 
prospect has had unsettling effects on the state criminal process. It 
has exerted pressures on the states to devise for themselves broader 
post-conviction remedies than they were otherwise ready to adopt in 
order to attempt to retain greater control over their criminal cases 
and to protect the integrity of their judgments. 
State reactions to these pressures have varied. Some jurisdictions 
have done nothing to create post-conviction procedures in the modern 
sense, retaining only the common-law writs which in their classic 
form are ill-adapted for the review of convictions on the numerous 
grounds now available. Others have taken one or another of the 
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common-law writs and judicially fashioned a somewhat broader sys-
tem of post-conviction remedies. Still others have adopted, through 
statute or rule of court, post-conviction procedures geared more or 
less to the type of litigation stimulated by the expansion of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the increased availability of federal habeas 
corpus. No state, however, has as yet developed a completely satis-
factory procedure. Thus, by the time the ABA launched its project 
on minimal standards of criminal justice in 1965, the problems of 
federal-state relationships, finality of convictions, and the rising tide 
of prison litigants were among the most discussed issues concerning 
the courts and criminal procedure. The common focus of these issues 
is post-conviction litigation. 
It was, then, in response to the felt concerns of the day that the 
ABA Advisory Committee on Sentencing and Review1 produced 
Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies as its initial report. 
In giving early attention to this subject, the committee said that "it 
anticipated the emphasis placed by Justices Brennan and Clark in 
Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965) on speedy improvement in 
state systems for post-conviction relief as the best way to decrease 
federal intervention in the handling of complaints of injustice made 
by state prisoners" (p. vii). The Committee quite clearly agrees with 
those Justices that state post-conviction systems are, on the whole, 
inadequate to meet today's needs. Their attitude and entire report 
rest on a series of assumptions, namely, that federal judicial in-
volvement in state criminal cases is undesirable, that federal habeas 
corpus will not be reduced in scope, and that the best way to limit 
federal post-conviction interference is for the states to develop 
systems of review at least as broad as federal habeas corpus. In short, 
the committee assumes that it is primarily the existence of federal 
habeas corpus which makes desirable the establishment of state 
procedures patterned after the 1963 Supreme Court decisions which 
recast the federal writ in its present form.2 If there is any short-
coming in this excellent study, it is the failure to probe beneath 
these assumptions to the heart of the post-conviction problem-the 
degree of finality to be accorded convictions. However, the com-
mittee did recognize this as being the key question (p. 5), and, for 
reasons discussed below, may have acted wisely in making these as-
sumptions and thus limiting the scope of its report. 
Apart from the pressures created by the expanded federal habeas 
I. This Advisory Committee consists of Judge Simon E. Sobeloff (Chairman), James 
V. Bennett, Dean C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr., Jack P. F. Gremillion, Judge Florence M. 
Kelley, Judge Theodore B. Knudson, Judge Edwin M. Stanley, William F. Walsh, 
and Prof. Herbert ·wechsler. The reporter on post-conviction remedies is Prof. Curtis 
~ R. Reitz of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
2. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); 
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). 
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corpus remedy, the committee suggests another source of impetus 
for its proposals. Changes in the constitutional criteria governing 
criminal prosecutions have resulted in a situation in which many 
persons presently in prison were put there under procedures that are 
no longer constitutionally permissible. A post-conviction procedure 
is the only way to afford relief to such prisoners, and, therefore, with-
out regard to federal habeas corpus, the states are under pressure to 
establish such remedies to deal with these transitional problems 
(p. 1). ·whether states ought to afford relief to convicted persons 
claiming past infringement of newly formulated rights turns on a 
judgment as to whether these rights should be given retroactive 
effect. The committee thinks they should "where sufficient reasons 
exist" [Standard 2.1 (vi)]. One sufficient reason in the committee's 
view, and the only one it mentions, exists in cases in which "the 
change in law sets a new minimum standard of reliability in the 
guilt determining process" (p. 38). By incorporating this into its 
standards, the committee has adopted the view that retroactivity is 
a function of the post-conviction remedy, rather than an aspect of 
the newly-born right itself. Although the Supreme Court has not 
adopted this view,3 it is submitted that it is in fact the better ap-
proach to the problem. 
Given these various assumptions, this report is an admirable job. 
Perhaps the best words for it are "comprehensive" and "realistic." 
Standards are laid dmvn for every imaginable aspect of post-convic-
tion litigation; they deal not only with judicial practices, but also 
with the litigants and their counsel. For example, the standards go 
beyond in-court procedures to cover such matters as the counseling 
of penitentiary inmates (Standard 3.1), the responsibilities of court-
appointed attorneys following an adverse decision [Standard 4.4(b)], 
and the procedures that are needed to fit the facts of today's in forma 
pauperis prisoner litigation. In short, the report abandons the con-
cepts inherited from habeas corpus in favor of direct, simplified 
means for resolving the sorts of issues now being presented. 
The committee begins by recognizing two major realities. One 
is that post-conviction litigation, largely as a result of federal habeas 
corpus, has today become an established, routine part of the criminal 
process, and thus, functionally, is neither a "civil" remedy nor 
an "extraordinary" proceeding. The other is that the initial step 
in such litigation nearly always is taken by indigent laymen in prison 
without legal counsel. Recognition of these twin actualities has a 
significant effect in designing a procedure for post-conviction litiga-
tion. For example, since such litigation is a continuation of the crim-
inal process, the venue of the hearing is placed in the court in which 
the challenged conviction was rendered [Standard l.4(b)], and the 
3. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
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respondent is the State, not the individual warden (Standard 1.3). 
And since we are dealing with uncounseled laymen, little impor-
tance is attached to pleadings, and there is a pervasive emphasis-
more so even than that found in modern procedure generally-on 
getting to the merits of claims and disposing of them on that basis.4 
Despite this emphasis, the standards do contemplate two situ-
ations in which a court might decline to decide the merits: (1) 
where the claim has been "fully and finally litigated in the proceed-
ings leading to the judgment of conviction" [Standard 6.l(a)]; and 
(2) where there has been an "abuse of process" [Standards 6.l(c) and 
6.2(b)]. The meaning which the committee gives these two phrases 
is worthy of note. 
The standards declare that for this purpose an issue "has been 
fully and finally litigated when the highest court of the state to 
which a defendant can appeal as of right has ruled on the merits of 
the question" [Standard 6.l(a)(ii)]. In other words, even if a peti-
tioner fully litigated the identical issue at his trial, he is not pre-
cluded from a post-conviction hearing, if he did not also take an 
appeal, or if he did appeal and the appellate court for one reason or 
another did not pass on the issue. Thus, a person is afforded a second 
evidentiary hearing at the trial level. It can quite reasonably be 
asked why this should be allowed, assuming that there was a fair 
opportunity to appeal and counsel was available. In light of the 
committee's position that, "in the main, post-conviction remedies 
exist to try fundamental issues that have not been tried before" 
(p. 86), is it not going an unnecessary step beyond this to say that a 
full and fair hearing during the original prosecution in the trial 
court is itself insufficient to prevent a duplicating hearing later? 
The committee gives no explicit answer to this; however, one 
may surmise from the tenor of the report that it would probably 
respond that justice will be better served and most efficiently admin-
istered by a court's proceeding to decide the merits of a post-convic-
tion claim than by its spending the same amount of time, or more, 
determining whether a fair opportunity to appeal had been in fact 
afforded following an earlier trial. Put differently, if one of the 
major concerns about repetitious litigation is the consumption of 
judicial time, a case can be made for the proposition that in the type 
4. In this respect, as in others, the standards depart from the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act, even as revised in 1966. An important difference in form 
between the two is that the Uniform Act is a proposed piece of legislation ready to 
be enacted, whereas the standards are general guides, some of which must be imple-
mented through legislative action and some through judicial action: to make fullest 
use of the committee's standards cooperative efforts on the part of the legislature 
and the courts of a state are required. However, as the committee indicates (p. 102), 
the extent of agreement between the act and the committee's standards outweighs the 
extent of difference. An appendix to the report contains a helpful, section-by-section 
comparison of the act and the standards. 
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of situation here under consideration judicial time is no more con-
sumed, and may actually be saved, by again litigating the merits. 
The court cannot, in any event, avoid a hearing. It must either hear 
evidence on the circumstances of the defendant's failure to appeal or 
on the merits of defendant's claim. Given that choice, the commit-
tee's view, although not specifically articulated with reference to this 
appeal problem, is that justice is better served by ruling on the 
merits (p. 3). It is difficult to quarrel with this conclusion, however 
uncomfortably the idea of a second trial-court hearing of the same 
issue may rest amidst traditional notions of adjudication. Indeed, 
there is much to be said for the attitude that since post-conviction 
litigation is thrust upon us, like it or not, the courts should accept 
it and not expend time fencing over threshold procedural questions. 
An "abuse of process" sufficient to preclude a determination of 
the merits of a post-conviction claim can occur, according to the 
standards, as a result of a non-assertion of the claim either at the 
original prosecution stage or in a previous post-conviction proceed-
ing. In either case the claim, whether factual or legal, must be one 
which the petitioner "knew of and which he deliberately and in-
excusably failed to raise" at the earlier time [Standards 6.l(c) and 
6.2(b)]. By this standard and the accompanying commentary, the 
committee joins the Supreme Court in rejecting the postulate of the 
common-law adversary system that a right can be lost simply by not 
being asserted at the appropriate point in the proceedings.5 This 
issue, usually cast in terms of "forfeiture" or "waiver," has been a 
fighting point in the post-conviction arena for some years. One of the 
most useful portions of the committee's report is that which clarifies 
the terminology and the concepts surrounding this point (pp. 36-37, 
88-89). 
The committee's analysis proceeds from a distinction between 
"foreclosure by judgment" and "voluntary relinquishment." The 
former results from the procedural law of the forum concerning the 
raising of questions and the finality of judgments. By not asserting 
a claim in the time and manner prescribed by procedural rules, a 
defendant was traditionally said to have "forfeited" or "waived" the 
claim and to be foreclosed by the judgment. The committee, how-
ever, prefers to use the term "waiver" to refer only to a voluntary 
relinquishment, that is, to a situation in which the defendant intel-
ligently and understandingly foregoes a right. This distinction can 
be a crucial one when a federal constitutional right is claimed by a 
state prisoner, for the question of whether the assertion of that right 
is foreclosed by the prior judgment of conviction is a matter to be 
decided under state law, whereas the issue of whether there has been 
5. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 427-39 (1965). 
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a waiver-in the voluntary relinquishment sense-is itself a federal 
constitutional question. 
The foreclosure by judgment situation is the more troublesome 
one. There is a widespread, and historically respectable, view that, 
given representation of the defendant by counsel, the entry of the 
conviction finally settles (subject to direct appellate review) not only 
all questions actually litigated, but also all those which might have 
been litigated. The committee expressly rejects this view, except in 
cases in which the post-conviction court finds that there was a delib-
erate and inexcusable failure to raise the issue-an abuse of process. 
There are two aspects of the abuse of process standard that re• 
main unclarified. First, what does "inexcusable" mean, and what 
does it add to "deliberate"? If a defendant has deliberately not raised 
an issue at his trial (assuming some acceptable dictionary meaning 
of "deliberate"), why should he be allowed to assert it after final 
judgment? In other words, if the choice not to assert the right was 
deliberate, why inquire into whether the choice was also inexcus-
able? The second unclarified point is whether the defendant himself 
must have personally made the decision not to raise the question at 
trial or whether he will be bound by his counsel's decision. The 
report uses only the word "he." It would have been helpful to know 
whether the committee means to adopt the "deliberate by-pass" con-
cept from Fay v. Noia,6 which literally calls for a decision by the 
defendant himself, rather than his attorney. Perhaps the committee 
intentionally left the matter ambiguous, which is a fair way of de-
scribing the present state of the federal habeas corpus law on this 
point. The commentary states that a right "ought never to be 
deemed waived by silence or inaction" (p. 37); but then it proceeds 
to say that troublesome difficulties will remain, "notably in mat-
ters of trial strategy where the choices of defense counsel have the 
potential of being construed as waivers of defendants' rights" (p. 37). 
Cited, among other cases, is Henry v. Mississippi,7 a decision which 
raised still unresolved questions as to whether this aspect of Fay v. 
Noia was being watered down to the extent of reinstating some of 
counsel's traditional control over the litigation. 
Whether or not the committee intended by its abuse of process 
standard to adopt precisely the federal habeas corpus position (what-
ever that is), it is clear that the spirit of the committee's standard is 
the same as the spirit manifested in Fay v. Noia: foreclosure by judg-
ment is rejected; post-conviction adjudication on the merits is not 
to be denied if the only objection is that defendant could have liti-
gated the question at his trial but did not do so. Regrettably, the 
commentary, which incisively delineates the differing meanings of 
6. Id. at 438-39. 
7. 379 U.S. 443 (1965). 
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waiver, does not explain why the committee takes this position. An 
immediately obvious reason is the presence of federal habeas corpus. 
If a state court should refuse a post-conviction adjudication on the 
basis of some concept of waiver or foreclosure narrower than the 
deliberate by-pass concept of Fay v. Noia and Henry v. Mississippi, 
the effect would be simply to pass the petitioner along to a federal 
court where there would be no such bar. To prevent this, the states 
should employ a standard which at least approximates the federal 
test. In other words, we are once again drawn back to the committee's 
basic assumption that broad state post-conviction remedies are de-
sirable in order to reduce federal judicial intervention. 
'While the prevailing federal practice is a solid enough practical 
reason for the states to adopt more relaxed views on foreclosure, it 
is not altogether satisfying for those who reflect a bit more deeply 
on the question. For them, the inquiry moves one more step: Why, 
even under federal habeas corpus procedure, should a convicted per-
son be entitled after final judgment to litigate an issue which he had 
a fair opportunity to litigate, with counsel, at his trial? There are 
at least two explanations, though the committee does not mention 
them. 
One rests on a recently arrived at value judgment (which, in 
fact, may be no more than a visceral feeling) that the adverse con-
sequences of a criminal conviction are so much more serious than 
the consequences of civil litigation that the ordinary rules regarding 
the foreclosing of issues should not be applied; stated somewhat dif-
ferently, the consequences are sufficiently serious to justify overrid-
ing the traditional procedural rules and the general desire for or-
derly, one-time litigation. Nevertheless, looking at the facts, it is 
doubtful that a conviction today has more adverse effects on an indi-
vidual than it had in the past when the foreclosure-by-judgment 
principle was intact. Actually the effects are probably less disastrous 
because of the trend toward more humane sentences: fines, sus-
pended sentences, and probation are now common; capital punish-
ment is on the way out; and the average sentence is probably shorter. 
Nor is there a sound basis for thinking that the failure to raise meri-
torious issues at trial is more frequent now than in the past; on the 
contrary, Gideon v. TVainwright8 requires counsel in all serious cases, 
thus affording considerable assurance-at least more than was pre-
viously available-that rights will be asserted. In essence, then, the 
discarding of the foreclosure-by-judgment concept, introduced by 
Fay v. Noia in 1963 and potentially carried over to the states by the 
committee's standards, does not rest on changes in factual conditions, 
but rather on a change of attitude about the criminal process. For 
8. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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reasons not very well articulated anywhere, many people-perhaps 
most people, including a majority of the Supreme Court and pre-
sumably of this advisory committee-have come to think it better 
to let an accused have a second chance at raising important issues 
such as those concerning constitutional safeguards. Inadvertence or 
oversight in not asserting such matters at the first opportunity is be-
lieved to be an insufficient basis for denying another opportunity for 
their assertion. This attitude is reinforced by the belief that in most 
cases the failure to raise a meritorious constitutional claim at the 
original trial is, in fact, due to nothing other than inadvertence, mis-
take, or ignorance. This appraisal is probably realistic, although 
there will be situations in which trial tactics can suggest that a point 
not be raised, as Henry v. Mississippi acknowledges. 
This leads to a second, but also unarticulated, explanation for 
the position of the committee and of the Supreme Court-a lack of 
confidence in the bar. Feelings of this sort are uncomfortable to dis-
cuss and are not often voiced openly, certainly not formally in judi-
cial opinions or in published reports such as the one presently under 
consideration. But if one considers at length the design of post-
conviction remedies, as reflected in federal habeas corpus and in the 
committee's standards, and attempts to root out the ultimate why 
of it all, he comes almost inescapably to this lack of confidence as 
one of the factors without which the no-foreclosure feature of the 
post-conviction system would not make much sense. In England, 
where mutual confidence is high both within the bar and between 
the bench and the bar, a procedural rule undercutting finality of 
judgments to this extent is probably unthinkable. Whether such a 
rule is sound in this country depends on whether there is a solid 
factual basis for the assumption that there are widespread, serious 
inadequacies among lawyers defending criminal cases. While we lack 
organized empirical data, every lawyer and judge has his own obser-
vations and impressions, and perhaps collectively this is enough. 
After all, such is the basis upon which men act in fixing many public 
policies. It is common knowledge that the educational backgrounds, 
intellect, and abilities of lawyers are highly uneven, as is the level 
of preparation and performance in particular cases. The question 
for anyone evaluating the reach of post-conviction remedies is 
whether he is satisfied that these levels dip so low in a sizeable 
enough number of cases that a system for post-final judgment review 
should be constructed to protect against lawyers' deficiencies. In any 
event, this problem should be thought about explicitly and discussed 
openly. The legal profession purports to be a learned calling which 
controls its membership in terms of both competence and character. 
Thus, it is not surprising that there is some uneasiness about ·writing 
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into law an arrangement resting on lack of confidence in legal 
practitioners. 
It is readily apparent that adherence or non-adherence to the tra-
ditional concept of foreclosure of issues by judgment is a major key 
to the scope of a post-conviction remedy. The other equally impor-
tant key concerns the grounds which can be relied on to invoke the 
remedy, that is, the sorts of claims that may be litigated at the post-
conviction stage. By manipulating the foreclosure rule, the grounds 
for relief, or both, we can broaden or narrow the scope of the remedy 
and correspondingly weaken or strengthen the finality of convictions. 
For example, providing numerous grounds for attack on convictions 
would not greatly weaken finality if issues which could have been 
raised at trial are foreclosed by the judgment of conviction. On the 
other hand, even though very few grounds of attack are made avail-
able, finality might be markedly weakened by rejecting foreclosure 
by judgment. The committee's standards, following the pattern of 
federal habeas corpus, contemplate a broad remedy, at the price of 
finality of convictions. To achieve a maximum breadth, the stan-
dards strike along both paths: they prescribe a large catalogue of 
grounds for attack and, at the same time, discard the foreclosure by 
judgment concept. The only two checks, as mentioned earlier, may 
be showings by the State of a prior full and final litigation of the 
issue or of an abuse of process. 
The grounds for relief provided in the committee's standards are 
more extensive than those existing under the federal habeas corpus 
procedure where the sole theory available to a convicted state pris-
oner is that he is being held in custody in violation of the United 
States Constitution. Thus, although the standards allow claims that 
"the conviction was obtained or sentence imposed in violation of the 
Constitution" [Standard 2.l(a)(i)], they include in addition numer-
ous other grounds for relief (Standard 2.1). One of the more inter-
esting suggestions is that "evidence of material facts, not theretofore 
presented and heard" be included [Standard 2.l(a)(v)]; ordinarily, 
this has been a matter for a new trial motion under limited circum-
stances. Here again, though, one is left wishing that the committee 
had undertaken to explain a bit more fully why it recommends these 
grounds for relief. It is hardly self-evident that every violation of 
the Constitution, prior to entry of final conviction, justifies giving 
relief after the conviction has been entered. 
As with the foreclosure or waiver problem, an immediate reason 
is clearly the existence of federal habeas corpus. Unless the state post-
conviction remedy is designed to adjudicate all of a prisoner's con-
stitutional claims, a federal court will adjudicate them. But again, 
as with the foreclosure problem, this is not altogether an intellec-
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tually satisfying answer. Why should a federal court, or any court, 
allow the post-conviction litigation, for example, of whether certain 
evidence was obtained by the State unconstitutionally, in a case 
where the defendant was represented by counsel and in all other 
respects had a fair trial? Considering the realities, questions of this 
sort can be meaningfully addressed only to the Supreme Court or 
to Congress, for unless federal habeas corpus is reshaped, the pres-
sures will remain on the states to have post-conviction remedies of 
equal scope, and under such circumstances debate over the proper 
scope of state remedies seems academic. 
What is needed, then, if the matter is to be gotten at root and 
branch, is a more thoroughgoing study of the federal post-conviction 
remedy for state prisoners. This is particularly important if ·we 
accept the committee's premise that whatever the scope of the fed-
eral remedy, the state remedy should be at least as broad. On this 
premise, the proposed standards and the commentary are excellent. 
But the really tough questions concerning finality and the criminal 
process are not reached unless we get to the federal writ. 
The committee rightly notes that "[t]he essential problem is the 
degree of finality to be accorded to criminal judgments, a vexing 
problem of many strands" about which "[t]here is only a beginning 
of scholarly evaluation in depth ... " (p. 34). If such a study were 
pursued, it might be fruitful to explore making distinctions between 
various constitutional rights for the purpose of determining which 
could be asserted through post-conviction procedures and which 
could not be. A similar distinction is being made and discussed in 
connection with the retroactivity problem. The committee's stan-
dards suggest retroactive effect if the constitutional issue relates to 
the reliability of the guilt-determining process. Why not apply that 
test in identifying grounds for post-conviction relief? One can ra-
tionally argue by analogy to the harmless error rule that the interests 
in finality should prevail where the constitutional violation has not 
touched the reliability of the procedures and evidence by which the 
defendant was found guilty. 
The committee mentions that "the relevance of inquiry into the 
degree of prejudice that an applicant suffered in the proceeding un-
der challenge" is among "the less fully articulated questions of post-
conviction review" (p. 34). But it then suggests that all of the 
presently recognized federal constitutional grounds are sufficiently 
fundamental so that prejudice can be assumed. This needs a more 
discriminating examination. The assumption that all of a defen-
dant's constitutional rights are "fundamental" had much more valid-
ity two decades and more ago than now. Then, the constitutional 
limitations on criminal prosecutions were relatively few, and they 
were indeed of a fundamental nature. Today, however, there is a 
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progressive move toward converting the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Bill of Rights into "a code of criminal procedure."9 When 
we are dealing with a comprehensive, detailed code, it becomes less 
convincing to call everything in it fundamental. The right to coun-
sel, for example, can fairly be called fundamental in the sense that 
the assertion of all other rights depends upon it, and that it goes to 
the essence of a fair and full hearing. Is there not, however, a dis-
tinction which can rationally be made for purposes of post-conviction 
attack between an infringement of the right to counsel and, for 
example, the introduction into evidence by the State of a pistol 
obtained from the defendant's house under circumstances making 
the search illegal in a case in which the defendant had counsel and 
a full opportunity to litigate the issue at trial? 
Lack of confidence in the bar has been mentioned in connection 
with the rejection of the judgment-foreclosure rule. The same atti-
tude about the quality of lawyers may affect decisions as to availa-
bility of grounds for post-conviction relief. If any constitutional 
issue were removed as a ground for post-conviction review, it would 
have to be with the understanding that defendant had counsel at 
trial so that he could have litigated the issue there. It is but a small 
step, then, to say that counsel means "competent" counsel, or even 
"effective" counsel. To put an extreme case, if it were shown that 
the defendant's lawyer was drunk during the trial, we would be 
uncomfortable, to say the least, in contending that the defendant 
nevertheless should not be able to assert a constitutional claim 
through a post-conviction procedure. The effect of making certain 
constitutional issues not available as grounds for post-conviction re-
lief would be to transform the post-conviction proceeding into a 
forum for evaluating trial counsel. In other words, rather than re-
ducing post-conviction litigation, this would, as a practical matter, 
simply shift the focus of the inquiry in many cases from the merits 
of the constitutional issue to the performance of the defense counsel. 
Convicted prisoners are often both litigious and ingenious. Trial 
counsel have already become fairly frequent subjects for post-con-
vention attacks, and they would probably become so more often if 
petitioners were prevented from litigating the merits of some of 
the presently available constitutional claims in post-conviction pro-
ceedings. 
Given a choice between litigating all constitutional claims on 
their merits and litigating the competence or performance of law-
yers, many of the bench and bar would no doubt opt for the former. 
Such issues are more manageable and familiar; moreover, no one 
can look with enthusiasm on the prospect of making lawyers and 
9. See Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. 
REV. 929 (1965). 
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their work the subjects of constant court attacks. Besides, if the as-
sumption of no confidence is well founded, it is possible that more 
convictions might be upset on the basis of inadequate defense counsel 
than on the merits of the various constitutional issues now available 
as grounds for post-conviction relief. 
The committee might reasonably have considered that an in-
depth examination of the finality problems surrounding federal 
habeas corpus was beyond its terms of reference. Its job, after all, 
was to formulate standards for state post-conviction remedies. In 
order to do that within the time expected, the committee seems 
justified in making the realistic assumption that federal habeas 
corpus will probably be with us in its present form for some time 
to come: all efforts to alter the Supreme Court's 1963 decisions 
broadening the writ have failed, and Congress instead has now codi-
fied a large part of those decisions.10 Because of this course of events, 
it seems fair to say that public opinion has ratified what the Court 
has done. American society evidently has grave doubts about making 
convictions too final, and it evidently approves abandonment of the 
idea of foreclosure by judgment as to constitutional issues in crim-
inal cases. The committee's standards thus are probably coincident 
with prevailing national attitudes about the criminal process and, 
at the same time, are themselves evidence of these attitudes. 
Whatever the proper scope of post-conviction remedies should 
be, there is a pressing need-if any such remedies are to be allowed 
at all-for specifically designed modem statutory machinery in this 
area. Adoption of specially designed procedures would not only im-
prove the administration of justice, but would also relieve the courts 
of the headaches of utilizing habeas corpus and other common-law 
writs in distorted roles which they were never designed to play. 
Even with the imaginative judicial surgery which has been employed, 
the "great writ" is still in certain aspects anomalous as a remedy 
for attacking convictions. It simply does not quite fit. These kinks 
can be ironed out in a statutory remedy aimed at reviewing convic-
tions in their modern context, thereby leaving habeas corpus to its 
historic role of providing a means of challenging illegal detention 
not pursuant to a conviction. 
As a blueprint for state legislative draftsmen and state courts, 
the standards and commentary are excellent. They address them-
selves to all the troublesome questions, such as whether the judge 
presiding at the prosecution should preside at the post-conviction 
hearing [Standard I.4(c)], whether a heavier sentence should be per-
missible on a re-trial [Standard 6.3(a)], and whether a sentence not 
being served should be subject to attack (Standard 2.3). They recom-
mend useful procedures such as discovery [Standard 4.5(b)] and pre-
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Supp. II 1965-1966). 
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hearing conferences [Standard 4.6(a)]. Finally, they put salutary 
stress on the State's obligation to supply the court with helpful infor-
mation in response to every petition [Standards 4.2(a) & 4.3(a)]. 
Comprehensively and realistically, the standards cover every nook 
and cranny of post-final judgment review. While one might differ 
on some details of the procedures recommended, the committee's 
work is undeniably valuable, for here, at last, in one well-organized 
document, are all of the ideas and innovations which have been 
bantered about in recent years, plus some fresh suggestions, for mak-
ing efficient this new phase of the criminal process. 
Daniel ]. Meador, 
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University of Alabama Law School 
